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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the roles of vision and leadership in creating and directing Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory from the late 1960s through the 1980s.  The story divides into two administrations having 
different problems and accomplishments, that of Robert R. Wilson (1967-1978), which saw the 
transformation from cornfield to frontier physics facility, and that of Leon Max Lederman (1979-1989), in 
which the laboratory evolved into one of the world's major high-energy facilities.  Lederman's pragmatic 
vision of a user-based experimental community helped him to convert the pioneering facility that Wilson 
had built frugally into a laboratory with a stable scientific, cultural, and funding environment. 
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Introduction 
 
In the fall of 1978, when Leon Max Lederman stepped into Robert Rathbun Wilson's 
shoes to become the second director of Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory,  he found 
them rather large.  He could not think of walking in them comfortably.  “I'm a good 
physicist," Lederman conceded, “but Bob is a great man."1 
 
     In 1967, Wilson had set out to design and build a facility of unprecedented scope and 
cost on the Illinois prairie.  Its site was in Batavia, about thirty miles west of Chicago.2  
By 1972, he had completed the accelerator known as the Main Ring, with an energy of 
500 BeV (billion electron volts), more than double the agreed upon 200 BeV.  Moreover, 
drawing on his bold imagination and relentless frugality, he delivered the machine ahead 
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of schedule, under budget, and with three times the promised number of experimental 
areas.3 
 
     Wilson's difficulties began when he then immediately proceeded to apply the unspent 
six million dollars allocated for the Main Ring toward a scheme for doubling its energy 
by circulating its proton beam through an added ring of superconducting magnets.  This 
technology had not yet been tried for a large proton synchrotron.  Wilson called the new 
ring the Energy Doubler; the machine was renamed the Energy Saver during the nation's 
energy crisis. 
 
     The United States Department of Energy (DOE) did not approve Wilson's unofficial 
reallocation of funds.  He was required to return the excess to the federal treasury.  
Construction of the Doubler was then stalled by heated controversy between Wilson and 
the DOE over future funding.4  For this reason, Lederman “found good and bad news" on 
taking the reins in 1978.  Among the good news was that the “the group that Bob Wilson 
had assembled was really magnificent."  Moreover, “the vision of a superconducting 
accelerator (Energy Doubler/Saver) was very clear.  The tradition of architecture and 
ecology were firmly established, as was the style which somehow strove to preserve 
individuality within the need for impressive collaborations."  The bad news was that “in 
the transition, the focus had been lost, the Lab was impoverished, and the physics 
program was hostage to an under-funded Saver project:  a project whose physics goals 
were ill-defined."5 
 
     Having worked for thirty years at the front lines of particle physics, even in Wilson's 
leaky trenches, Lederman offered what Fermilab needed to fulfill its promise as the 
world's highest energy physics laboratory.  Drawing on his rhetorical skill, sense of 
humor, ability to negotiate, and his boundless passion for physics, Lederman made allies 
of Wilson's antagonists.  He upgraded facilities that Wilson had built frugally into long-
term structures.  He made Fermilab a stable environment for physics research. 
 
     This paper examines the roles of vision and leadership in creating and directing a new 
physics instrument in the midwest from the late 1960s through the 1980s.  The story 
divides into two administrations having different problems and accomplishments.  The 
first, under Wilson, saw the transformation from cornfield to frontier physics facility; the 
second, under Lederman, witnessed the evolution of the initial facility into one of the 
world's major scientific laboratories. 
 
 
Wilson's Vision 
 
 The vision with which Wilson built Fermilab reflected his own self-image, one he often 
expressed in terms of three figures:  the pioneer, the craftsman (or blacksmith), and the 
Renaissance man.  The pioneer was for Wilson an explorer who boldly and independently 
confronts the limits of known territory, including man's understanding of Nature.  
“Research plays a present-day role analogous to the role that opening of the west played 
at an earlier stage in our country,” he wrote in the period when he built Fermilab.6 
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     Unlike the brutal conquerers described by historians of the American West, Wilson's 
pioneer was a noble frontiersman whose explorative ventures were shaped by democratic 
ideals.  The image matched the self-sufficient explorer described in the 1890s by the 
historian Frederick Jackson Turner.7  Wilson applauded the pioneer's can-do attitude, his 
resourcefulness and his willingness to cope practically with fundamental matters.  Since 
1945, when Vannevar Bush wrote  Science, the Endless Frontier, many physicists had 
associated the search for new scientific information with exploring frontiers.8  Frontier 
imagery had also appealed to a number of the physicists whom Wilson admired, 
including his Berkeley mentor, Ernest O.Lawrence, and his Berkeley colleague and 
director at Los Alamos, J. Robert Oppenheimer.9 
 
     Wilson chose for his laboratory an institutional model drastically different from the 
scholarly university selected by Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), or the 
rugged military camp chosen by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).10  His model 
was a peaceful prairie, with a large expanse of open space, tall prairie grass, and natural 
habitats for native wildlife, even a herd of bison. 
 
     For this frontier site, he designed a spare, but powerful accelerator where physicists 
would conduct simple, elegant, and clever experiments.  The accelerator beam was to 
circulate in an underground tunnel, with little visible disruption on the surface.  He 
envisioned a machine of “great beauty” that would “add to the satisfaction of our lives.”  
The project would be “primarily spiritual.”11 
 
     As for the laboratory community, he envisioned a utopian “science city" governed by 
noble ideals:  democracy, civil rights, equality, respect for diversity and environmental 
preservation.12  “In the course of giving a very large acceleration to our particles, let us 
hope that we can contribute at least a small acceleration to society," Wilson said.13  His 
response to questioning from Senator John Pastore in April 1969 about the role of the lab 
regarding national defense has become legend:  “It has to do with, are we good painters, 
good sculptors, great poets?  I mean all the things we really venerate and honor in our 
country and are patriotic about.  It has nothing to do directly with defending our country 
except to make it worth defending."14 
 
     Wilson's second image, the hands-on craftsman, was no less important to his vision.  
When machinery broke down during Wilson's boyhood, he would avoid the long and 
lonesome ride into town by visiting the blacksmith's shop, where he would hammer out a 
replacement part.  “Working with him, I had the confidence that with your own hands 
you could build large contraptions and make them work.  Then I used to work in the 
blacksmith shop just for the hell of it, and learned how to use my hands and make things.  
I think that was a very useful part of my training."15  Like the blacksmith, the engineers at 
Edison's Menlo Park, or the physicists working on the Manhattan Project, Wilson was a 
pragmatist.  In the tradition of William James and John Dewey, Wilson trusted hands-on 
experience.16 
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     Wilson’s most comprehensive image of himself was expressed by his third figure, the 
Renaissance man, in whom art, spirit, and nature are unified.  Some historians have 
looked toward “Renaissance naturalism" to explain the birth of modern science.17 In 
Wilson such a naturalism awoke about 1954, when he was in Paris studying art.  The 
sensibility came into focus about 1965 when he was again studying art and sculpture in 
Europe.  He compared Gothic cathedrals with accelerators, finding that both express the 
spirituality of their age.  He felt that both achieved their aspirations and expression when 
form, function, and focus worked together in an upward surge of purpose. 
 
 
     While thinking in these terms, Wilson received a copy of the 1965 proposal put forth 
by a Berkeley team for a 200-BeV proton synchrotron.  Wilson criticized the design.  He 
considered it too expensive and overdesigned.  It fell short of the heights of creativity he 
expected of a large accelerator.  Wilson's aesthetics called for frugality in building 
apparatus and facilities.  On artistic grounds he believed “that something that works right 
away is overdesigned and consequently will have taken too long to build and will have 
cost too much.”  He worried that the “exorbitant” expense of accelerators would halt the 
advance to higher energy.  A component built frugally might not immediately work as it 
should, but it could be fixed, modified, or even recycled18 This had been the attitude at 
Berkeley in earlier times, in particular, when Wilson studied there under Lawrence in the 
1930s.  Wilson made his criticisms of the proposal known.19 
 
     Less than two years later, Wilson was offered the chance to build the new several 
hundred GeV accelerator his way.  In December 1966, President Lyndon Johnson and the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) approved for the project a 6800-acre site in Weston, 
Illinois.  The open spaces and skies of this prairie expanse became a blank canvas upon 
which Wilson would design the laboratory that became Fermilab.  We have elsewhere 
described how Wilson, his Associate Director Edwin Goldwasser, and many others, built 
Fermilab to fit his Renaissance aesthetics and ideals.20 Suffice it to say he was granted 
considerable decision-making power, both by the AEC and by the Universities Research 
Association (URA), the university consortium created to govern the new laboratory.21 
 
     Unlike Brookhaven and Berkeley, criticized for favoring users from their own 
geographical regions, the new laboratory would welcome proposals from all regions of 
the United States.  A national laboratory in which users would be “at home and loved" 
had been a theme of an earlier paper by Leon Lederman, then a user at Brookhaven.22 It 
had disturbed Lederman when Brookhaven granted beamtime prefentially to its east-coast 
users and when young physicists had trouble getting in the door.  At a Brookhaven users' 
meeting in 1963, Lederman proposed the notion of the “Truly National Laboratory," or 
TNL.  Unlike BNL, the TNL would be a users' paradise offering complete on-site 
facilities for outside users, scheduling and advisory committees to assure fairness in the 
allocation of beamtime, and free communication between management and users.  The 
accessibility of the facilities would be “a right to any physicist bearing a competitively 
acceptable proposal.”23  
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    Wilson and Goldwasser tried to realize this vision of the TNL at the new midwest 
facility.  To emphasize the centrality of its role, Wilson secured the consent of President 
Johnson to name the laboratory “The National Accelerator Laboratory,” or NAL.24 Users 
from around the world would in fact dominate the research program of the laboratory.  It 
was specified that 75% of the research program would be performed by users and 25% by 
resident staff members.25 One of Wilson's reasons for appointing Goldwasser as his 
Associate Director was his prior success in instituting a comparable user policy at 
Argonne National Laboratory.  NAL was later renamed Fermi National Accelerator 
Laboratory, or Fermilab, in 1974. 
 
     Wilson found it difficult to attract permanent staff to NAL.  He drew on rhetoric as a 
tool.  As a boy growing up on the plains of Wyoming, he had listened to his male 
relatives spin tales around the campfire and learned that “it was how you told the story 
that mattered.”26His recruiting efforts appealed to the sense of community that binds 
compatriots on a common venture.  “Most of all, I want someone to come and say, `I'm 
going to work on this job, and I am going to live in this area, and this is the laboratory 
with which I'm going to identify, and I am going to be committed to its success.”27 Often 
Wilson's rhetoric drew on frontier narratives.  In 1973, addressing the difficulties of the 
primitive working conditions at the laboratory, he told experimentalists that they were 
“presently ready to embark on [an] adventure,” to unravel Nature's mysteries, which at 
this juncture were “just as much of a challenge to the experimenter as they were when our 
pioneer forebears started at the beginning of the century.”28 
 
     Wilson's vision was initially compelling to his staff and to the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE) in Washington D.C.  But over time the picture revealed 
inconsistencies in his philosophy, for instance, between his frugality and goal to achieve 
“higher energy or bust," or with his commitment to users.  Wilson agreed with 
Lederman's philosophy of a “user's paradise,"29 but in the managerial structure of his 
laboratory, he was careful to draw distinctions between the roles of users and competing 
interests represented by the members (supposedly unbiased) of the laboratory's external 
Program Advisory Committee, as well as his own URA Board of Trustees.  Moreover, 
Wilson's policy of providing minimal experimental equipment conflicted with the trend 
to conduct much larger and more precise experiments.  Users did not agree that 
“providing expensive facilities, even any facility, may tend to paralyze better 
developments later on.”  Nor did they accept that “techniques and research interests 
change so rapidly that it is better to let the major part of these areas grow out of the actual 
ideas and demands of the experimenters at the time they use the machine.”30 
Experimenters did not appreciate the functional flaws of the architecturally interesting 
experimental halls built under Wilson.  They complained about working in leaky tunnels, 
old barns, and other inadequate structures, while Wilson kept his eyes on the future, 
directing much of the lab's funding to the Energy Doubler. 
 
     It also became clear that the very notion of a collaborative venture of lone 
frontiersmen is paradoxical.  For, as in any effort to herd cats, there is an intrinsic 
paradox in demanding independent users to stay in line with the dictates of a strong 
director.31  Other inconsistencies of Wilson's vision concern the long life of a laboratory 
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created almost entirely of makeshift structures.  On the level of patronage, Wilson's 
conviction that physicists should have privileged status in requests for government 
funding was revealed as a relic of the postwar years.  In the late 1970s, politicians and 
their constituents no longer related to the social value of the work of physicists, 
notwithstanding Wilson's noble words to Senator Pastore in 1969. 
 
     Wilson was among the first to recognize certain contradictions in his vision.  In an 
essay published in  Daedalus in 1970, “My Fight Against Team Research,” he explained 
that “as a young man” he had sought the life of “the lone scientist in pursuit of truth.”  He 
had “accepted the cliche” that individual research was “creative, poetic, and enduring,” 
while team research was “superficial, uncreative and dull.”  But when he came to study 
the nucleus he discovered that “it is almost as hard to reach the nucleus by oneself as it is 
to get to the moon by oneself.”  He embarked on team research, but retained 
“ambivalence" and “prejudice” against the notion.32 
 
     Wilson's leadership ultimately felt the strain of inadequate funding.  In his early years 
as director, he had dealt easily and informally with the Atomic Energy Commision 
(AEC), which had emerged out of the Manhattan Engineer District.  His chain of Los 
Alamos and Berkeley connections, indeed gave him an insider's conduit up to his old 
friend Glenn Seaborg and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.  But 
during Wilson's tenure, the funding environment changed suddenly and dramatically 
when, in January 1975, President Gerald Ford's administration transformed the AEC into 
two new agencies:  the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  ERDA and the Department of Energy 
(DOE), which replaced ERDA in October 1977 during President Jimmy Carter's 
administration, were different; unlike the AEC they were organized to deal with  all the 
nation's energy needs, not only with atomic and basic energy research.  Funding for high-
energy physics research was now in competition with many diverse public projects.  Like 
the leaders of the other projects, the directors of national laboratories were expected to 
travel to the Capital to justify their funding requests.  Wilson objected.  His job, he felt, 
was to lead his people on his site.33 
 
     The conflict between Wilson and Washington reached crisis proportions after John 
Deutch came into office in 1977 as Director of the Office of Energy Research.  Deutch 
questioned Wilson's assumption that DOE was committed to fund the Doubler.  The 
conflict stalled negotiations and the Doubler sat in limbo.  Wilson resigned in protest 
early in 1978.  In May URA accepted Wilson's resignation. 
 
     Then URA proceeded to seek Wilson's successor.  The first offer went to SLAC's 
Burton Richter, a 1976 Nobel Prize winner.  He declined.  In mid-summer 1978, URA 
nominated Lederman.  As Fermilab's highest profile user, and with an outstanding record 
of research achievement and scientific statesmanship, Lederman was a natural candidate.  
Wilson was among those who strongly encouraged Lederman to take the job.  Lederman 
agreed to serve as Director Designate until June 1, 1979, and then assume full office as 
Director.  In the interim, Philip V. Livdahl continued to serve as Acting Director.34 
 
 7
 
Lederman's Vision 
 
Fermilab's guiding vision switched with the change in director.  Like Wilson, Lederman 
structured his vision on his self-image.  It was unabashedly romantic:  it rested on his all-
embracing passion for physics research.  But it was practical, too. 
 
     Lederman often admitted in his public talks and popular writings that “the life of a 
physicist is filled with anxiety, pain, hardship, tension, attacks of hopelessness, 
depression, and discouragement."  But he insisted that physics was worth the pains, 
because the study offered two special pleasures.  One was to experience rare “Eureka" 
moments of discovery -- “punctuated by flashes of exhilaration, laughter, joy, and 
exultation."  These “epiphanies" derive from “the sudden understanding of something 
new and important, something beautiful."35 He explained that “the best discoveries 
always seem to be made in the small hours of the morning, when most people are asleep, 
when there are no disturbances and the mind becomes contemplative."  The experimenter 
sits off in a lonely laboratory staring at numbers. “You look and look, and suddenly you 
see some numbers that aren't like the rest -- a spike in the data.  You apply some 
statistical tests and look for errors, but no matter what you do, the spike's still there.  It's 
real.  You've found something.  There's just no feeling like it in the world."36  
 
Almost as exciting were the everyday tasks of research.  In one anecdote from the 1950s, 
Lederman and Gilberto Bernardini, a visiting experimentalist from Rome, build a particle 
counter at Columbia University.  Working late into the night, long after the machinists 
had gone home, they finished insulating, soldering, and flushing gas through the charged 
system to which an oscilloscope was attached.  Suddenly Bernardini went “stark, raving 
wild" and cried “Mamma mia!  Regardo incredibilo! Primo secourso!"  Shouting and 
pointing, he lifted Lederman up in the air and danced him around the room.  “What 
happened?"  Lederman asked.  “Izza counting.  Izza counting!"  Lederman joined 
Bernardini in the excitement over having built “with our hands, eyes, and brains" a 
device that could detect cosmic-ray particles.37 
 
     Lederman felt that a national physics laboratory should be a total environment for 
nurturing both the epiphanies and the day-to-day work of experimental research in one 
“user's paradise."  While on its basic philosophical level Lederman's vision hardly 
differed from Wilson's, the details were different.  Realizing Lederman's idea meant 
addressing the needs of users.  Having spent most of the last three decades immersed in 
experimental research at numerous laboratories in the United States and Europe, 
Lederman came into his position as Fermilab director with the authority to promote his 
user-friendly vision for the laboratory.  He was widely known for his good taste in 
selecting fertile physics problems and for his many successful experiments.+  
                                                          
+ They included, the discovery of the long-lived neutral K meson; the magnetic moment of the muon using 
magnetic resonance; parity violation in the muon's beta-decay, the “two-neutrino experiment" 
demonstrating the neutrinos that arise from muon decay (for which he shared the 1988 Nobel Prize with 
Melvin Schwartz and Jack Steinberger); evidence for the particle later known as the J/psi (for which 
Samuel Ting and Burton Richter won the 1976 Nobel Prize); and the discovery in 1977 of a family of 
Upsilon particles, the first evidence for the bottom quark. 
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The Immediate Crisis of the Doubler and the Call for Outside Advice 
 
Lederman's term as Director Designate began in crisis.  The accelerator builders and 
experimenters at the laboratory could not wait until he became Director to know whether 
they would compete with CERN in the race to discover the W and Z vector bosons.  In 
1975 and 1976, Carlo Rubbia had proposed that Fermilab convert its Main Ring into a 
colliding-beams machine to achieve the higher energies needed to detect these particles, 
but Wilson and his Physics Advisory Committee rejected the idea.  38 Rubbia then took 
the proposal to CERN, where it was accepted. 
 
     Fermilab could compete only if it built a collider of comparable energy based on the 
Main Ring.  That however implied giving up Wilson's fight for the Doubler, at least in 
the foreseeable future.  An important question was whether the Doubler was in fact 
feasible.  To investigate, Lederman called on experts.  He appointed “three wise men" to 
serve as the Doubler Review Committee:  Matthew Sands of Caltech, Richter of the 
Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), and Boyce McDaniel of Cornell.  
Discussing Fermilab's technical issues from October 1978 to January 1979, this 
committee gave Lederman confidence in the Doubler's technical viability. 
 
     To address a range of questions about Fermilab's future, Lederman issued an 
invitation to all of the Fermilab physicists to an Armistice Day “shootout."39 Meeting all 
day and into the night on November 11, 1978, the group sorted out the possibilities.  
After eighteen hours of heated discussion, Lederman had his decision.  Fermilab would 
forego the race for the W and Z and would complete the Doubler, so that in the future the 
laboratory could collide beams at higher energy and preserve its front-line position at the 
energy frontier.40  
 
     Completed in 1983, the Doubler became the basis for Fermilab's 800 GeV accelerator, 
the Tevatron.41 The laboratory's new initiative was divided into two programs:  a proton-
antiproton colliding-beams program with energies close to 2 TeV (trillion electron volts) 
known as Tevatron I; and the enhanced fixed-target program operating at almost 1 TeV 
known as Tevatron II. 
 
 
Working with Washington 
 
Lederman had never before dealt with budgets as large as those of Fermilab, but he had 
had considerable experience working on issues of science funding.  He had often served 
on national and international physics advisory panels, especially after 1961 when he was 
appointed Director of Columbia University's Nevis Cyclotron Laboratory.  He was a 
founding member of the High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP).  This 
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experience,  together with his years of writing grant proposals,  had brought him into an 
extensive network through which he quickly learned of available funding. 
 
     A gifted comedian, adept with words, he proved effective in the Washington corridors 
of power.  Calmly assessing each audience, he seemed to know intuitively when to draw 
on science, emotion, or humor.  Unlike Wilson, he resigned himself to his role in 
Washington.  “I'm constantly shuttling to Washington to cajole federal and congressional 
officials into keeping budget cuts to a minimum," Lederman told an interviewer.42 
 
     Lederman's initial hurdle was the bitter legacy of Wilson's battles with Deutch over 
the Doubler.  A circumstantial problem was DOE's heavy investment in ISABELLE, 
Brookhaven's rival superconducting-magnet project.43 Lederman worked through and 
around the problems with the skill of a poker player.  Fermilab's Bruce Chrisman vividly 
recalled Lederman's cool performance during one Washington visit in the early days of 
his tenure as director.  The purpose of the trip was to review the finances of the 
accelerator division and to secure several million dollars promised for the Doubler. 
 
     In one scene, the Fermilab contingent sat tensely around a conference table in DOE's 
Forrestal building as they and several DOE officials waited for Deutch, who was late.  
When Deutch arrived, he sat down at the head, leaned back, and stretched his legs out 
across the table, as if displaying his authority.  The subsequent interplay was “not exactly 
friendly," Chrisman reminisced.  Deutch frequently interrupted Lederman's prepared 
remarks.  Lederman ignored the jibes and continued his presentation.  Other physicists 
might have lost their composure, but Lederman stayed calm and “didn't rise to the bait."  
Afterwards, Deutch released the funds.44 
 
     For his partner in dealing with the DOE, Lederman made effective use of Andrew 
Mravca, who was then working at Fermilab as DOE's in-house liaison.  The two “new 
boys on the block" worked closely, informing the DOE of all progress at Fermilab and of 
the lab's compliance with DOE's bureaucratic requirements, for instance, the imposed 
“project management plan."  Where Wilson had flatly rejected such procedures, 
Lederman and Mravka accomodated.45 Fermilab's relationship with Washington 
improved dramatically.  “The Wilson-Deutch problem was an unneccessary tragedy since 
they were both charismatic personalities who could have gotten along very well," 
Lederman later commented.  “Each was stubborn and insisted on his prerogatives."46 
 
 
 
Building for Permanence 
 
Lederman broke with Wilson's philosophy of building for the short term, even if that 
occasionally meant overspending.  He recognized that inferior facilities were a liability 
for physicists competing on the world stage.  Europe was now competitive with the U.S. 
in the field of high-energy physics. 
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     Lederman added many research capabilities to Wilson's design, including sounder 
buildings and laboratories.  The additions included a magnet factory, a muon experiment 
building, a new computing center, an antiproton source, and collision halls to house two 
mammoth and supremely complex particle detectors -- a magnetic detector, CDF (the 
Colliding Detector at Fermilab), and a rival nonmagnetic detector project, DZero.  The 
collision facilities where hundreds of researchers collaborated in the same experiment 
allowed Fermilab to leap forward in its transition from big science to megascience.47  
 
     Lederman endorsed a substantial upgrade of the Tevatron, the Main Injector, which 
was completed during the administration of Fermilab's third director, John Peoples.  This 
upgrade not only provided an increase of energy to 900 GeV but increased the luminosity 
of the proton-antiproton collider and doubled the fixed-target intensity.  In his last years 
as director, Lederman also planned what he saw as Fermilab's next machine, the 
Superconducting SuperCollider (SSC).  But his vision of building the SSC at Fermilab 
became clouded by many factors which we discuss in another work.48  
 
 
Realizing the Users' Paradise 
 
Lederman sympathized with the experimentalists working in Wilson's leaky pits. After 
all, he had been one of them.  As Head of Fermilab's User's Organization, he had 
dedicated the laboratory in 1974 as the realization of his ‘Truly National Laboratory.’  
But he could not overlook the reality that Fermilab was not the users’ paradise he had 
described in 1963.  He transformed and modernized the experimental program and its 
facilities, cultivating the idea that leadership of experiments should come from the users, 
not from the director. 
 
     As the experiments increased in scale and cost during the 1980s, the complexity of 
their management tasks multiplied.  As the lead times grew longer, the flow of jobs 
clogged and Lederman was forced to deal with tighter schedules and running times.  In an 
effort to approve larger-scale exeriments, Lederman and his Program Advisory 
Committee cut the number of experiments drastically, but the laboratory still did not have 
adequate resources to meet all user demands.  But while Wilson responded by elevating 
frugality to a virtue, Lederman would pragmatically ask whether each experiment really 
needed all the requested resources to achieve its physics goals and then he found the 
funds. 
 
     The greater scale and complexity of experiments planned for Tevatron II pushed the 
issue of computing as never before.  Wilson had been philosophically opposed to 
computing because it violated his sense of what it meant to be a physicist.  Lederman met 
the needs of experimenters by supporting various initiatives, including the building of the 
Feynman Computing Center.49  
 
     Lederman also worked to broaden the research staff, expanding in theory and 
astrophysics and attracting many specialists to the laboratory.  He hired one of the world's 
leading theoretical physicists, James Bjorken, to invigorate the interplay of experiment 
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with theory.  To help with detector planning, he brought in Georges Charpak, who had 
invented unique scintillation detector materials at CERN. 
 
 
Cultivating Democracy 
 
     Lederman took a personal interest in building community.  He was considered an 
approachable director who enjoyed and encouraged contact with his staff.  For instance, 
he instituted a Director's coffee held every afternoon, where he regularly mingled with 
colleagues.  Once a year he hosted a “Run with the Director," at which employees jogged 
with him around the 4-mile Main Ring.  His personal touch extended to cultivating 
friends and allies for Fermilab by inviting agency officials and international leaders to his 
home on site.  Lederman made every effort to boost morale by spending time with his 
staff and showing appreciation for their achievements, often with parties. 
 
     Decision-making had a greater semblance of democracy under Lederman than under 
Wilson.  As illustrated in the way in which Lederman approached the decision on the 
Doubler, he typically began by seeking the advice of experts.  For instance, to review the 
design of the antiproton source for Tevatron I, he called in Maury Tigner of Cornell, 
whose advice resulted in an improved design employing stochastic cooling.  Similarly in 
May 1983, Lederman appointed Joseph Ballam from SLAC to head a committee to 
decide on Fermilab's future computing needs.  Powerful computing innovations were 
then incorporated into the experimental program.50 Lederman often turned to the 
physicists he appointed to his Senior Advisory Group (SAG), or in his first years to those 
on the “Underground Parameters Committee" (UPC), a group of accelerator physicists 
determined to discuss the design and performance of the Doubler. 
 
     Unlike Wilson, Lederman felt no need to manage details.  Typically he would set a 
direction and delegate the achievement of a job to others while he moved on to the next 
task.  This style of leadership allowed myriad activities to go on simultaneously.  
According to A. Lincoln Read, Lederman “would let a thousand flowers bloom and 
encourage people to stretch their own imaginations, thinking through a proposal in 
whatever way they saw fit."51 
 
 
  Lederman's Cultural Legacy 
 
Lederman enlisted many volunteers and paid employees to institute cultural and social 
improvements at the laboratory and to bolster local support from neighboring 
communities.  He added an on-site day-care center, a restaurant (Chez Leon), a users' 
center, and a gymnasium.  He began a distinguished lecture series, increased the number 
of performing arts programs, and established ongoing exhibits in the laboratory's art 
gallery.  He extended Wilson's Prairie Restoration Project by pursuing the formal 
designation of Fermilab as a National Environmental Research Park (NERP).  He 
expanded Wilson's history of accelerators project into a larger history of particle physics 
program. 
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     Lederman's legacy of science education outreach began in 1980 with the start of 
Saturday morning physics classes for local high-school students.  Fellowships for talented 
particle physicists and minority students allowed Fermilab to compete with universities 
for staff.  In 1982, Lederman established the Friends of Fermilab, a not-for-profit, grass-
roots organization to raise support for innovative national math and science education 
programs, such as the Summer Institute for Science Teachers.  Working with the Fox 
River Valley Industrial Association to support regional advances in math, science, and 
computer education, he enlisted the Friends of Fermilab to create the Illinois 
Mathematics and Science Academy, a statewide residential program in Aurora for gifted 
high-school students.  Later Lederman and the Friends of Fermilab worked with 
educators to found the Teachers Academy for Math and Science in Chicago. 
 
     To nurture technology transfer from research at Fermilab to the larger world, 
Lederman established Fermilab's Industrial Affiliates.  One example of such transfer was 
the Loma Linda Medical Accelerator, which was built at Fermilab and began treating 
cancer patients in California in the spring of 1989.  Lederman served as chairman of the 
Governor of Illinois' Science Advisory Committee, and he was Vice Chairman of the 
Illinois Coalition, promoting prosperity in Illinois through investment in science and 
technology enterprises.  Lederman also planned a scientific exchange program with 
developing nations in Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Mexico.52  
 
 
  Conclusion 
 
The creation and work of a large research laboratory requires the collaboration of 
hundreds, often thousands, of workers.  Their projects and style of activity is shaped by 
the visions of their leaders.  In the case of Fermilab, the creation and early decades of 
work at the laboratory was shaped by Wilson's founding myth, which in turn reflected his 
self-image as expressed through the figures of the frontiersman, the craftsman, and the 
Renaissance man.  But the unification of science, art, and spirit that Wilson sought was 
constrained by the local conditions within which he worked in the late 1960s and through 
the 1970s. 
 
     One constraint was place.  He construed his midwest prairie site as a frontier 
comparable to that encountered by pioneers traveling West in an earlier period of 
American history.  The best and the brightest physicists were used to conducting research 
at the established institutions on the East and West coasts.  To attract them to Illinois, he 
drew on compelling frontier imagery and rhetoric about the self-reliant individual who 
heroically overcomes obstacles in the wilderness, and he also appealed to the spiritual 
uplift attained through the unification of art, science, and Nature. 
 
     Limited funding was another constraint.  To help compensate, he exploited imagery 
about the resourcefulness, independence, and manual craftsmanship exemplified by the 
blacksmith of his youth.  He glorified frugality to the level of virtue.  Drawing on 
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innovative designers he succeeded in producing a workable technology that exceeded the 
specified 200-GeV design. 
 
     Over time, the inconsistencies of Wilson's vision angered and disappointed 
researchers.  Experimentalists needed funding, not virtue, to compete on the world stage.  
Wilson's philosophy of frugality conflicted with the notion of a permanent laboratory and 
with the reliability required by experimentalists seeking to make indisputable discoveries.  
The lone frontiersman performing quick and dirty experiments could not outperform 
large amply-funded collaborating teams performing large-scale frontier experiments.  
And as the Washington climate for research patronage changed, Wilson could no longer 
lead his laboratory successfully.  Lederman's more pragmatic vision better matched the 
period in which he served as director.  He converted the laboratory that Wilson had built 
frugally for the short-term into a facility having a more stable scientific, cultural, and 
funding environment. 
 
     In his exceptional history of the rise of the modern business enterprise,  The Visible 
Hand, Alfred Chandler highlighted the importance of a stablizing second phase that 
follows the rapid growth characteristic of the founding phase of the business.  Now the 
managers who come into control concern themselves with integration, coordination, 
efficient administration, and reorganization to create stability for the long term.53 
Chandler lamented that the historians and economists writing on his subject before him 
had focused on the entrepreneurs or the financiers -- those associated with the founding 
of the company.  “They have paid almost no notice at all to the managers who, because 
they carried out a basic new economic function, continued to play a far more central role 
in the operations of the American economy than did the robber barons, industrial 
statesmen, or financiers."  Chandler's analysis raises an important question for the study 
of large national laboratories:  Do such research labs, if they are to endure,  require a 
phase in which the director stabilizes the rapid expansion that follows the laboratory's 
creation? 
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